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FOREWORD 
Dear Readers, 
After you have not heard from MISSOC for sev-
eral months now, we are happy to be able to share 
with you that the end of 1997 marks a period in 
which many new events and reforms were 
launched. The European Commission, Director-
ate-General V, made the decision in 1997 to con-
tinue the MISSOC information system and, fol-
lowing a previously announced open call for ten-
ders, renewed the assignment of secretariat duties 
to the ISG institute for a period of five years. 
Subsequently, the Commission, together with the 
MISSOC correspondents in the Member States, 
agreed on a series of changes. 
Beginning in 1998 the date pattern changes for 
the annual issue of the publication Social Protec-
tion in the Member States of the European Union. 
The comparative tables in this publication will no 
longer refer to the situation on 1 July but rather to 
the legislation on social protection as it stands on 
1 January of the year under review. So you will 
not have very long to wait for the appearance of 
this publication's next edition. 
And more importantly: MISSOC will also be pre-
sent from May 1998 in the Internet. Via the 
MISSOC Website you will be able to access in-
formation in the comparative tables directly, even 
prior to the date of the publication appearing in 
print. That will mean that in future your informa-
tion will be more up-to-date than ever before 
possible. 
The Internet will also make it possible in future to 
bring the stock of MISSOC data up to date not 
just once a year but in six-month intervals. In 
addition to the update on 1 January, which will 
also appear in print as usual, the Secretariat will 
update the information, in conjunction with the 
national MISSOC correspondents, a second time 
on 1 July of each year - this will not appear in 
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printed form, however, but be accessible via the 
Internet alone. 
Changes will also take place in how the contents 
of the comparative tables are presented. At the 
last MISSOC meeting in December 1997, first 
steps were already taken in editing the structure 
and contents of each table chapter to both ensure 
that the information presented is complete and in 
particular to improve the reader's ability to un-
derstand and compare the written data. In six-
month intervals, one to two tables will be put to 
the test each time and reworked - within the 
course of the five-year period now under way, the 
comparative tables will take on a new appearance 
and the quality of information will improve. 
You will continue to receive our MISSOC bulle-
tin three to four times a year, providing all the 
latest information on the developments in the 
Member States, as well as reports on specific 
topics. This present issue of MISSOC-Info 1/98 is 
dedicated to the topic of Privatisation in Social 
Protection Systems. As you well know, a work 
meeting comprised of representatives from the 
Member States who act as national MISSOC cor-
respondents takes place twice a year. On the 
agenda of this meeting is always a discussion of a 
specific topic proposed by the national corre-
spondents of the respective host country. At the 
meeting held on 22-23 May 1997 in The Hague, 
Netherlands, a thought-provoking discussion took 
place on the trend toward privatisation. Some of 
the correspondents had prepared reports prior to 
this meeting on the situations in their own coun-
tries, and we would like to present these in this 
issue ofMISSOC-Info to inform our readers. You 
will also find reports in this issue of MISSOC-
Info on the developments in the area of social 
protection in Belgium, Portugal and Sweden for 
1997. 
Cologne, March 1998 
MISSOC Secretariat 
Dr. Wilhelm Breuer 
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GREECE 
Social Security - Private Insurance 
The Social Security system in Greece reflects its 
public nature by virtue of formal constitutional 
provisions. Article 22 Paragraph 4 of the Consti-
tution provides for Social Security for workers to 
be incumbent on the State in accordance with the 
law. 
Despite the lack of formal constitutional provi-
sions insofar as private insurance constitutes an 
expression of contractual freedom, the legal basis 
for private insurance is provided indirectly by 
Article 5 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, guaran-
teeing economic freedom. 
Similarities and Differences between Social 
Security and Private Insurance 
Both proposals essentially establish the guarantee 
of benefits for a set risk (old age, death, disabil-
ity, unemployment). Social Security gives the in-
sured person general coverage, while Private In-
surance covers the insured up to a sum defined by 
the terms of a specific insurance contract. Note 
that the State tries to exert some control over So-
cial Security and also, to a lesser degree, over 
Private Insurance. 
The differences to be explored between these two 
perspectives on insurance are that Social Security 
is based on the law, while Private Insurance is 
subject to the terms of the insurance contract. In 
the first case, the principles of public law deter-
mine the insurance relation. Affiliation of the in-
sured to Social Security Funds is compulsory and 
occurs independently of the beneficiary's free-
dom to choose. In the second case, we are dealing 
with a private insurance contract which exhibits 
the will of the contractual parties and is governed 
by private law. 
Another point of distinction to note is that Social 
Security is offered by government authorities 
(legal entities under public law) which are based 
on the law, while Private Insurance has obliga-
tions incumbent on private agencies (public lim-
ited companies). 
In conclusion, it can be said that the objective of 
Social Security bodies is to reflect social inter-
ests, as opposed to the PLC's objective, which is 
to make a profit. 
The Current Situation 
As already pointed out, the Social Security sys-
tem in Greece refers to a compulsory scheme 
seeking to insure affiliated members through pub-
lic bodies. Every worker is obliged to enrol in a 
basic insurance scheme (retirement, sickness) as 
well as a supplementary insurance scheme. 
Moreover, note that Private Insurance operates 
with sufficient support from Greek legislation, 
which had also been adapted to Community Di-
rectives. 
Also, hardly excluded in this specific context, 
group insurance from the realm of private insur-
ance has been practised, parallel to compulsory 
membership of the insured, in large companies. 
At first the employers displayed reluctance in 
registering for a group insurance contract like the 
"retirement plan", since it is impossible to receive 
a tax reduction on retirement plan premiums for 
highly qualified personnel. But today, group in-
surance policies are sufficiently used, following 
an amendment to tax legislation which provides 
for the deduction of the premiums paid by com-
panies in their personnel's retirement plans. 
Nothing can dispel the concept underlying the 
distinction between the two systems. It can be 
said that the compulsory nature of Social Security 
renders Private Insurance as having more of a 
supplementary function and less of a competitive 
one. 
In conclusion, State authorities are not predomi-
nately preoccupied with privatisation in certain 
sectors of social protection in Greece; the concept 
of privatisation seems to not yet have been suffi-
ciently raised as a subject for debate between the 
social partners. 
With regard to the implementation of the two di-
rectives 49/92 and 96/92, the Greek legislation is 
currently abiding by these directives, even though 
the adaptation process has caused a stir, consider-
ing the decisiveness of such a transitional stage 
from a closed insurance market to a vast Euro~ 
pean market. 
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SPAIN 
To deal with the matter proposed by the Nether-
lands -"Practice and positions on social security 
privatisation"- from the Spanish point of view, we 
must bear in mind that there are no conflicting 
positions with relation to the public welfare sys-
tem, for which there is a political consensus in the 
form of a "Pacto de Toledo"; this agreement re-
ceived social support through the "Accord on con-
solidation and rationalisation of the social security 
system", signed last October by the Government 
and Trade Unions. 
In the public social security system we can distin-
guish different modalities of social protection with 
respect to their funding sources: 
- Contributory benefits funded basically through 
social contributions paid by employers and em-
ployees. 
- Non-contributory cash benefits, health care, so-
cial services and family benefits charged 
mainly to the National Budget; these benefits 
will bec~me tax funded in the short term. 
Together with these two levels of public protec-
tion, a supplementary third level can be found in 
Spain; it will be referred to it later on. 
With regard to social security management, its 
current evolution follows two lines: 
A) Decentralisation because of the State's own 
structure in the form of Autonomous Communi-
ties. 
B) Operational internal decentralisation, which 
also implies private enterprise involvement, but 
only as far as the rendering of concrete services is 
concerned, because its exclusive ownership and 
ultimate liability fall to the Government, in the 
sense established by the Spanish Constitution of 
1978. 
This private enterprise involvement materialises 
into several specific aspects: 
Health care: 
- Health care arrangements between private cen-
tres and the public system in order to provide 
care to patients accounted for by the ·public 
scheme. · 
- ·Private management of public hospitals under-
taken by non-profit organisations like founda-
tions, for instance. 
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Social services for which demand surpasses public 
supply. Therefore arrangements had to be reached 
with private institutions, once again, that have 
proved to be satisfactory up to the present. 
Coverage of accidents at work and occupational 
diseases 
In order to formalise coverage for employees 
against accidents at work and occupational dis-
eases, Spanish social security legislation enables 
employers to opt either for a competent manage-
ment agency or for an association with a Mutual 
Insurance Company for Work Injuries and Occu-
pational Diseases, which are statutory non-profit 
associations withjoint liability. 
The great majority of employers opt for the second 
possibility as to the insurance against accidents at 
work and occupational diseases. 
Furthermore, since 1995, this participation of pri-
vate enterprise in management has also been ex-
tended to the normalisation of coverage for tempo-
rary incapacity cash benefits. Consequently, the 
employer who has opted for the protection against 
professional contingencies provided by a Mutual 
Insurance Company can also enter an insurance in 
respect of sickness or non-occupational accidents 
cash benefits with the same Mutual Insurance 
Company. 
This option was already available to self-employed 
workers, who can also choose between having· cov-
erage or not for temporary incapacity cash benefits 
within the scope of the protection provided. 
Since 1993, employers are liable for the payment 
of temporary incapacity cash benefits from the 
fourth to the fifteenth day on a statutory basis, not 
as a result of collective bargaining. 
As mentioned before, Spanish social security leg-
islation includes a third supplementary level also 
envisaged by the Constitution. Such a supplemen-
tary level has a voluntary character, but never acts 
as a substitute for the public pension system. 
Moreover, one of the recommendations included in 
the Pacto de Toledo, signed by every political 
party with parliamentary representation, is the 
promotion of this supplementary sphere so as to 
improve the level of benefits provided by the 
public social security system, bearing in mind, in 
addition, that these mechanisms stand out as a 
paramount savings source in the long term. 
Finally, regarding problems arisen with relation to 
European Union legislation -specifically Directives 
92/49 and 92/96-, one must say that both regula-
tions address problems related with private insur-
ance, a topic that is out of the scope of the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs and is the responsibil-
ity of the Ministry of Finance and Treasury. Nev-
ertheless, we understand that there have not been 
problems in that respect, given that the new Act on 
Private Insurance (Act 30/1995, 8 November) has 
taken into account Community legislation on this 
matter. 
FRANCE 
Among the three great socialisation models (the 
contract, a relation in which the individuals set a 
rule, as conceived by Jean-Jacques Rousseau; the 
market which seeks to harmonise all interests 
through an invisible hand, from the theory set 
forth by Adam Smith; insurance according to the 
possibilities explored by Liebniz), the 19th cen-
tury, confronting problems posed by the market's 
difficulty in harmonising all interests retained the 
development of the insurance system as a means 
of constructing the social system. 
The social insurance models had at that time been 
of value in that risks were redistributed to certain 
categories of salaried workers until an evolution-
ary change occurred after World War II, which 
consisted of going over to a generalised coverage 
of the entire population. 
Compulsory social insurance 
During the course of the second half of the 20th 
century, public assistance, which constituted in 
France, since the end of the 19th century, the in-
terventionist principle of the State in the area of 
social protection, had had the mission of being a 
residual solution. Social insurance was then 
spread little by little to all sectors of the popula-
tion, both active and inactive. In fact, it slowly 
absorbed the other forms of social protection. 
Social insurance (generalised to social security) 
has thus emerged as a socialisation system, pro-
viding, on a universal basis, a good coverage 
level against social risks, while at the same time 
maintaining a social assistance system on the side 
with which to avoid deep poverty and leaving it 
to the initiative of individuals and groups to find 
or implement additional means of social protec-
tion. 
To implement this form of social protection on a 
universal basis, hinging on a system of compul-
sory membership which is indispensable for ap-
plying the principle of solidarity, France has de-
veloped an organisation which is neither state-run 
nor privatised. 
France believes that the State has neither the le-
gitimacy nor particular competence to assume the 
administration of social protection. And yet the 
country also believes that we should only take re-
course on private organisations, subject to market 
conditions, for handling marginal or supplemen-
tary aspects of social protection. In effect general 
old-age pension schemes operate on the basis of 
redistribution principles and a compulsory nature. 
Family benefits in no way follow a logic of insur-
ance. All form of selectivity, based on the state of 
health or/and capacity to contribute, must be pre-
cluded in the case of health insurance. 
Since then the organisation must depend on. a 
large delegation to social partners and on respect 
for policy guidelines taken and fundamental rules 
set by the State, who alone has the legitimacy and 
capacity to render arbitrage on the fundamental 
stakes of social protection. 
This delegation may be comprised, depending on 
the particular case, of schemes organised on a vo-
cational basis ( old-age pension, for example) or a 
national basis. In certain cases various businesses 
can be placed in competition to one another for 
the delivery of benefits of a given scheme (which 
is the case in health insurance for non-salaried 
workers). 
This situation is currently leading France to con-
sider the financing of basic social protection, irre-
spective of the risk under consideration (handi-
cap, old age, sickness, employment injuries ... ), to 
be a matter of national solidarity. 
Nevertheless for many years now, the issue sur-
rounding the negative effects of social security 
has been debated. Even though the social security 
system's legitimacy has not been shaken, we 
have been privy to debates pushing for a cleaner 
break between the different functions of social 
protection (for example by the committee for the 
defence of tradesmen and craftsmen at the origin 
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of the Poucet and Pistre case before the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities). Exigen-
cies have called for us to state that the social se-
curity system is more interested in objective 
situations than in manners of behaviour. In the 
relation thus created between individual and 
community, there is in effect a risk towards with-
drawing responsibility from the individual by 
objectivising his or her situation. It is on account 
of this situation that criticism has arisen. 
Nonetheless, the advantages of such a system are 
not to be minimised either. The principle of so-
cialisation, established within the scope of legal 
social security schemes by drawing on uncertain-
ties held in common, avoids a cleavage between 
two classes of citizens, in which the one would be 
insured and the other would insure himself. 
Thus, the part of social protection which can be 
left to individual initiative is not connected to risk 
but to the basic or supplementary nature of social 
protection. The borderline between these two 
concepts can be brought to change, but this is the 
present situation in France. 
It is also worth mentioning at this point that the 
decision taken at the tum of the 80s to stem the 
flow of that portion of the national income con-
secrated to a compulsory redistribution has ex-
panded the field of activity for supplementary 
protection (which could be implemented by pri-
vate agencies) in the areas of old-age pension, 
sickness insurance and welfare. 
The development of supplementary social pro-
tection 
The supplementary social protection devices had 
been upheld in 1945. It was necessary, on the one 
hand, to preserve the pension schemes set up for 
managerial employees before the second world 
war and, on the other, the mutual insurance com-
panies, which secured for the most part the busi-
ness of managing social insurance under the grip 
of the laws of 1928-1930 and saw themselves as 
answering to the call of ensuring supplementary 
health coverage. In both cases the supplementary 
coverage fell under the optical guise of solidarity, 
even though it was subsumed by more limited 
groups than social security, whose purpose is the 
general good. 
Nonetheless in the 80s, faced by an upper limit 
for coverage in some segments, organisations 
were forced to compete against one another in 
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order to maintain or increase their market share. 
This increase in competition had been accentu-
ated by the European directives which joined 
supplementary protection to insurance (Council 
Directive 73/239/EEC; 88/357 /EEC; 92/49/EEC). 
While a continuum between the social security 
institutions and those of supplementary social 
protection had existed in a social protection sys-
tem like the one in France, European law tends to 
establish the delimitation more precisely. As for 
the first, we acknowledge the monopoly held by 
social protection and in the latter, the market 
rules apply, especially in name of the principles 
encouraging liberal capital flow. 
Thus, supplementary protection seems to have 
become a market in which various types of enter-
prises encounter one another, hence comprising 
three different legal schemes: the code of mutual-
ity ( Code de la mutualite') for mutual insurance 
companies (which originated with the worker's 
solidarity principles at the beginning of the 19th 
century and is based on the principles of non-
profit-making, solidarity between their members 
and the functioning of democracy), the code of 
insurance (Code des assurances) for insurance 
companies (these propose individual contracts, 
for example supplementary health protection, but 
also operate on the basis of collective protection, 
either directly or by reinsuring institutions based 
on joint decision-making), the social security 
code (Code de la securite sociale) for parity wel-
fare institutions (these distant heirs of employer 
funds from the 19th century have become jointly 
administered at the end of the second world war. 
Today they have specialised in supplementary 
protection in a particular branch or enterprise). 
Nonetheless, the methods of supplementary social 
protection can be encourage~ to grow and change. 
In this way, even if the method of organisation of 
the French system of old-age pensions has not 
been put in question, the law of 25 March 1997 
has created the possibility for salaried workers, 
bound by a work contract under private law and 
coming under the general old-age pension 
scheme, to subscribe to a retirement savings plan 
(Fonds de pension). This retirement savings plan 
has no direct effect on the level of pension bene-
fits from the general scheme ( the benefits are in 
proportion to the amount of contributions paid) 
and from supplementary retirement schemes, in-
stituted by the social partners through interpro-
fessional agreements and to which salaried work-
ers are obliged to join, but allows those who have 
interest to profit from a different type of supple-
mentary coverage. 
This retirement savings plan clears the way, to 
the benefit of its members, _ to receiving a life-
long pension, paid out beginning on the date they 
permanently leave active employment. The re-
tirement savings plans can be joined by one or 
several employers or by a group of employers, to 
the benefit of their salaried employees. Payments 
made by the employee and the employer's contri-
bution to the retirement savings plans are op-
tional. The additional sum paid by the employer 
may not exceed four times the amount paid by the 
employee. The retirement funds are artificial per-
sons whose exclusive objective consists in cover-
ing the activities falling under the rubric of the 
savings retirement plans. The retirement savings 
funds must be constructed in the form of an joint 
stock insurance company, a mutual insurance 
company, a welfare institution or an institution 
based on mutual benefit. 
In this ~ay, with the creation of this third extra-
supplementary form, the French system has be-
come endowed with an additional element of pro-
tection against the risk of old age, based on the 
functioning of capital cover. 
In conclusion, we would like to point out that if 
general social protection, concerning in France 
the notion of national solidarity and does not 
have, for this reason, the mission to be managed 
by organisations under private law and subject to 
market conditions, then supplementary social 
protection does not induce the same demands and 
thus leaves a more important place open for the 
private-sector partners to develop. 
IRELAND 
Social Protection System in Ireland 
Under the social insurance system in Ireland, un-
like in most other EU countries all ben~fits pay-
able are at a flat rate. Supplementary income-re-
lated cover is provided for a proportion ofwork-
·ers under occupational or personal pension ar-
rangements and sick pay schemes. Given the na-
ture of social insurance cover in Ireland, the main 
debate in Ireland has been on whether a second 
tier income-related pension scheme should be 
provided under social insurance. 
Pensions 
In 1976, a Green Paper entitled "A National In-
come Related Pension Scheme" "was published by 
the Department of Social Welfare which recom-
mended the introduction of a Social Insurance 
scheme providing for income related pensions. 
This was not proceeded with mainly because of 
the economic difficulties and the growing level of 
unemployment in the 1980s. The priority instead 
has been to increase the level of social welfare 
payments, including, pensions, up to minimally 
adequate levels and to extend compulsory social 
insurance cover to all categories of the work-
force. This has now been largely achieved. 
In 1986, the National Pensions Board was estab-
lished to advise the Minister for Social Welfare 
on a range of issues, including the provision of 
income-related pensions for all employees. In its 
Final Report, published in 1993, the Board con-
sidered how income-related pensions could be 
provided. It concluded, that having regard to ex-
isting levels of coverage, international experience 
and the number of small employers in Ireland, it 
is highly unlikely that comprehensive pension 
cover, which would maintain established stan-
dards of living, can be achieved under the present 
national pension system ( compulsory social in-
surance for flat rate pensions and voluntary occu-
pational schemes or personal pension arrange-
ments providing supplementary cover). 
The Board also had serious reservations as to 
whether a second tier income related pension 
scheme under social insurance would be sustain-
able in the longer term, in light of the demo-
graphic projections and the projected level of 
contributions required just to finance first tier 
social insurance pensions. 
Accordingly, the Board recommended that cover-
age of occupational and personal pension ar-
rangements should continue to be encouraged, in 
particular, the existing tax treatment should be 
maintained. 
Before a final decision is made on what overall 
policy should be developed to extend pension 
cover, the Board recommended that a survey of 
occupational and personal pension coverage 
should be carried out to establish their coverage 
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and adequacy. A survey was commissioned by 
the Department of Social Welfare in 1996 and 
this found that less than 50% of the workforce 
has such pension cover. This means that signifi-
cant segments of the workforce and their depend-
ents are at risk of experiencing a sharp drop in 
living standards when they become pensioners. 
In response to this, the Minister for Social Wel-
fare and the National Pensions Board launched a 
pension's policy initiative, the first phase of 
which was the publication of a consultation docu-
ment. The main options set out in the document 
are: 
(a) increasing the level of flat-rate benefits avail-
able under social insurance and more effective 
promotion of voluntary occupational and personal 
cover (which would largely involve a continua-
tion of the present system); 
(b) introduction of second tier earnings-related 
pension scheme under social insurance; 
( c) mandatory pre-funded pensions cover under 
occupational cover or personal pension arrange-
ments. 
A related option under (a) or ( c) would be for the 
State to promote the establishment of industry 
wide schemes. 
The second phase of the Initiative is now well 
underway. This involves: 
- processing and analysis of the responses to the 
consultation document; 
- reviewing critically selected pension models 
from other countries, relating these to Ireland 
and developing options in the Irish context, 
and 
- finally, preparation of a report including the 
formulation of recommendations on the ac-
tions that need to be taken to achieve a na-
tional pensions system in line with the aim of 
the National Pensions Board as articulated in 
their Final Report. 
It is expected that this phase will be completed 
early next year (1998). The position of pensions 
(both first and second tier) will arise for consid-
eration in this context. 
The National Pensions Board in its final report 
also recommended that an Actuarial Review of 
the projected long term cost of first tier social in-
s 
surance pensions should be carried out every five 
years. The first such review, which covers the 60 
year period from 1996 to 2056, was launched and 
published in September 1997. The findings of 
this report will feed into the National Pensions 
Policy Initiative referred to above and will facili-
tate projections and discussion as to the levels of 
social welfare pensions that can be provided in 
the decades ahead and the costs of different op-
tions. 
Statutory Sick Pay 
The possibility of introducing some form of statu-
tory sick pay (SSP) was raised on a number of 
occasions in the 1980s and early 1990s. The in-
troduction of SSP was proposed in the context of 
achieving savings in the administration of sick-
ness benefits and as a means of bringing these 
benefits into the tax net. Other objectives in-
cluded: 
(a) the reduction of duplication between occupa-
tional sick pay schemes and the sickness benefit 
scheme under social insurance; 
(b) creation of incentive to employers to control 
sickness-related absenteeism; 
( c) reduction of the work disincentives which can 
arise when, a combination of occupational sick 
pay, sickness benefit and tax refunds create 
situations where some employees are financially 
better off when not working. 
The introduction of SSP was proposed by the 
Minister for Social Welfare in January 1992. The 
duration of SSP would be for 4 weeks, with pay-
ment of sickness benefit commencing from the 
fifth week. It was expected that fixing the du-
ration of SSP at four weeks would significantly 
reduce the number of sickness benefit claims by 
approximately 50% on the basis that a high pro-
portion of these claims were of short duration. 
It was proposed that the scheme would cover all 
employees insured for sickness benefit i.e. em-
ployees to whom the full rate PRSI applies. 
There would be no contribution conditions at-
tached to the proposed scheme, since employers 
would generally not be in a position to know if 
the contribution conditions had been met. On the 
basis that it would be unrealistic to expect em-
ployers to pay SSP at the existing sickness benefit 
rates as this would involve detailed investigation 
of the family circumstances of employees, it was 
proposed that SSP would be paid on the basis of a 
range of rates, linked to the employee's earnings. 
There would be no additions for dependents. 
Those earning £70 or over would receive £70 per 
week SSP, those earning less than £70 per week 
would get tiered rates. Because SSP would be 
paid as wages, it would be liable for tax and pay-
related social insurance. It was proposed to com-
pensate employers by way of an overall reduction 
in the employer's pay-related social insurance 
rate. 
A number of difficulties impeded the progress of 
negotiations on the introduction of the scheme, in 
particular, the mode of employer compensation. 
Employers sought compensation for both direct 
costs ( amount of benefit paid) and indirect costs 
(administrative costs). To meet the employer de-
mands would have conflicted with the overriding 
objective for introducing the scheme, namely, to 
achieve savings. There were also objections to 
the introduction of the scheme from the Trade 
Union movement on the grounds that some em-
ployees would receive a lower rate of SSP than 
under the existing sickness benefit scheme. 
In the event, the proposed scheme was not pro-
ceeded with. It was not possible to reach a satis-
factory agreement on the mode of compensation 
for employers. Improvements in computerisation 
also facilitated the taxation of sickness benefits in 
1993 and thus one of the main reasons for intro-
ducing SSP no longer applied. 
As explained above, there is already a large de-
gree of privatisation of social protection in Ire-
land. Supplementary income related pensions are 
provided entirely under occupational and per-
sonal pension arrangements. One option being 
considered in the context of the present pensions 
initiative in Ireland is whether such provision 
should be made in part at least by means of sec-
ond tier pensions under social insurance. If this 
were to occur, it would go against the current EU 
wide trends towards privatisation. 
There appears to be no immediate prospect of 
sickness benefits being replaced by statutory sick 
pay even for a relatively short initial period of 
sickness. 
NETHERLANDS 
Organisation of the social security system 
In the past the employee insurances were im-
plemented by Industrial Insurance Associations. 
In the fifties trade and industry ~ere divided into 
26 branches, and every branch had its own 
Association. The board of these Associations 
consisted of representatives of employers and 
employees organisations. The Associations were 
responsible for the collection of contributions and 
for the payment of cash benefits in the employee 
insurance schemes. They had a choice: they could 
carry out the insurances themselves, or let them 
be carried out by one specific administering or-
ganisation, the Joint Administration Office 
(GAK), in the board of which they were repre-
sented. Over the years the number of Associa-
tions has decreased and in the end there were 18, 
13 of which were affiliated with the GAK. 
During the eighties the number of claimants of 
disability benefits strongly increased. In 1990 
881.000 persons were entitled to invalidity bene-
fits. Although a number of measures were taken, 
the increase seemed uncontrollable and it seemed 
a very realistic prospect that failing further meas-
ures, the number of disabled persons would in-
crease to one million. This gave rise to political 
unrest, and many persons were of the opinion that 
the invalidity schemes had to be reformed. Be-
cause of this, in the early nineties a parliamentary 
inquiry into the implementation of the employee 
insurance schemes was set up. This inquiry con-
cluded that both the implementation and the 
content of the invalidity schemes needed to be 
fundamentally reformed. Amongst others, social 
partners were blamed for the large number of 
beneficiaries. It was said that they created an 
abuse of the sickness and invalidity benefits 
schemes. Instead of dismissing their employees in 
situations where the employee wasn't being 
productive enough or for economic reasons, they 
made it easier for those employees to get an inva-
lidity benefit. 
As far as the implementation is concerned, this 
has led to the following changes. 
In February 1994 a new bill on the Organisation 
of the Social Insurances was passed by Parlia-
ment. 
The Industrial Insurance Associations were no 
longer allowed to carry out the insurances them-
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selves, they must outsource the administration of 
the employees' insurance schemes to independent 
implementing bodies on a contract basis. To this 
effect the board and the administration had to be 
split up. The intention was that the Industrial 
Insurance Associations should be financially, ad-
ministratively and juridically completely sepa-
rated from the implementing bodies. From now 
on all the decisions on the payment of benefits 
had to be taken independently of the social part-
ners. The former implementing bodies trans-
formed themselves into Holding Companies, pri-
vate institutions, managed by a board of directors, 
with a public and a private part. The public part 
performs the implementation of the employee 
insurance schemes. The private part performs all 
kinds of private activities relating to social secu-
rity. Besides their "old" task of collecting con-
tributions and awarding benefits, they took on a 
very important new task: the stimulation of re-
employment of disabled persons. Two new insti-
tutions were established: one for the coordination 
and adjustment between the Industrial Insurance 
Associations (Tica), and one for the supervision 
of all organisations operating in the field of social 
security (CTSV). The board of the Tica consists 
of representatives of employers and employees 
organisations. The board of the CTSV consists of 
independent experts; employers and employees 
no longer play a part in this organisation. 
This bill was meant as a temporary measure to 
resolve the most urgent problems. It was consid-
ered to be a first step towards a completely new 
organisation in which the implementation of the 
employee insurance schemes are fully privatised 
and in which market mechanisms are introduced. 
In order to achieve this situation, a completely 
revised bill on the Organisation of Social Insur-
ances was passed by Parliament last March. 
The most important aim of the reorganisation 
process is to enable the implementing bodies to 
reduce the number of beneficiaries. Therefore the 
most important task of the implementing bodies 
has become the reintegration of beneficiaries into 
the labour market. 
The Industrial Insurance Associations don;t have 
a political function anymore. Instead of having 
these Associations, one central board was created 
which is responsible for the implementation of 
the employee insurance schemes. This is the Na-
tional Institute for Social Insurance (Lisv). Al-
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though this organisation is responsible for manag-
ing implementation, it is forbidden by law to 
carry out the implementation itself. It has to con-
tract out the implementation to one or more im-
plementing bodies. This means that the actual de-
cision on whether or not a person is entitled to a 
benefit is taken by the implementing body on 
behalf of the Lisv. The major tasks of the Lisv 
itself are the fixation of contribution rates, 
management of the funds, the budgeting of im-
plementation costs, advising on all policy matters 
and stimulating the reintegration of the bene-
ficiaries. The board of this organisation has a tri-
partite composition and an independent president. 
The former Industrial Insurance Associations 
have been transformed into sectorial committees. 
They have an advisory function to the central 
board with respect to issues which are specific for 
their sector and to the contracts the Lisv must 
assign to the implementing bodies. The central 
board of the Lisv contracts, upon advice of the 
sectorial committees, an implementing body for 
each sector separately. These contracts contain 
the agreements regarding the products the im-
plementation body is going to deliver, the number 
of products and what price the Lisv is going to 
pay for these products. The Lisv is free to decide 
with which implementation. body it will make an 
agreement. Because of this a certain degree of 
competition will be created. The philosophy be-
hind this is that this will decrease the implemen-
tation costs. 
Every administrative office can become an im-
plementing body on the condition that it has been 
recognised as such by the Minister. In order to be 
recognised it has to fulfil a number of conditions. 
It is possible that the implementing body is part 
of a holding, on the condition that there is a strict 
separation between the so-called public and the 
private part of the holding. By "public part" is 
meant the part which deals with the implemen-
tation of the insurance schemes. 
All the organisations which have been acknowl-
edged are allowed to compete for orders of the 
Lisv. For the period till 1999 the contracts have 
been concluded with 4 implementing bodies 
which have already existed: GAK, GUO, SFB 
and Cadans. After the expiration of this period 
the Lisv has to call for new tenders from all 
recognised implementing bodies. At that moment 
it is possible for other private organisations to 
compete for orders. 
As mentioned earlier a major task of the Lisv is 
reintegration of beneficiaries into the labour mar-
ket. This can best be achieved when the imple-
mentation of the employee insurance schemes is 
regionalised in order to obtain optimal co-opera-
tion between the labour supply organisation and 
the municipalities. Therefore in the future the 
central work of the administration will not be 
centralised, but regionalised. 
Supervision of all these institutions is carried out 
by the CTSV (Supervisory Board). The CTSV is 
responsible for the supervision of a lawful and 
suitable implementation of the social insurances. 
The CTSV in tum has to account to the Minister. 
One could say that the Netherlands are now in a 
period of transition, from a system in which the 
employee insurance schemes are carried out by 
social partners to a system in which the schemes 
are carried out by private organisations on the 
basis of competition and under independent 
supervision. If we come that far depends on 
whether market mechanisms are going to work in 
this field. Will it in reality be possible to shift the 
implementation body to the private sector without 
incurring enormous costs; are there private 
insurance companies who want to enter the social 
insurance market? This will mainly depend on the 
possibilities for making profits. 
Benefits in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the discussion on the privati-
sation of social security is centred on the question 
of who will pay the financial burden of benefits. 
Views on compulsory financing have shifted 
from a public fund which is filled with both 
employers' and employees' contributions to fi-
nancing through the individual employer, who is 
obliged to bear the full financial burden of work-
related benefits, or to the employee paying as a 
private person on a voluntary basis. 
Sickness 
For example for workers who have called in sick, 
employers can be obliged to continue paying 
wages. In 1994, this obligation was introduced in 
the Netherlands to cover the first six weeks of 
illness. Small companies were given some lee-
way: they were only required to continue paying 
wages for two weeks. In 1996, this period was 
extended to all employers to the full duration of 
the former benefit period of 52 weeks under the 
Sickness Benefits Act (ZW). Only a few catego-
ries of persons retain their entitlement to a bene-
fit, namely temporary workers, unemployed per-
sons and pregnant workers. 
Invalidity 
The contributions for invalidity insurance, which 
are usually paid both by employers and employ-
ees, are placed entirely on the shoulders of the 
employers as from 1 January 1998. In the Nether-
lands there is no separate insurance against acci-
dents at work and occupational diseases. Employ-
ers are responsible for the health and safety of the 
people on company grounds. At the same time, a 
system of differentiated contributions has been 
introduced: the higher the illness rate, the higher 
the contribution will be for the employer. This 
will convince employers that favourable working 
conditions pay off: it is always cheaper to invest 
in health and safety of workers than to pay the 
costs involved in their illness and disablement. 
Basically, it is the responsibility of employers to 
keep their personnel at work whenever possible, 
even if workers would be considered disabled by 
traditional standards and even when the cause of 
their disablement is to be found in events occur-
ring outside the working place, for instance dur-
ing a ski-holiday. 
On 1 January 1998, an amendment to Dutch dis-
ablement legislation will come into effect which 
gives Dutch employers the option of carrying the 
risk of benefit payments themselves for disabled 
workers during the first five years of disablement, 
provided that certain solvency requirements are 
met. The benefits are established and calculated 
by the social insurance organisations on the basis 
of statutory provisions, while the payments are 
made by the employer. If an employer chooses 
this option, he must carry the benefit expenditure 
himself and may thus wish to take out insurance 
on his own. In such a situation it is obviously in 
the employer's interest to assist the employee in 
returning to work or finding another position as 
soon as possible, which is a major objective of 
Dutch government policy. 
Originally, it was the government's intention to 
enable employers to opt out of the statutory sys-
tem altogether. In that case, they would be 
obliged to cover the risk of opting out by taking 
out insurance. Under the rules on free movement 
of services laid down in the third directive on 
non-life insurance, insurance companies seated in 
other Member States can also operate within the 
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Dutch market. In formulating policy, the govern-
ment had to pay special attention to the fact that 
employers and foreign-based insurance compa-
nies were free to conclude insurance agreements, 
but that the workers who depended on these 
agreements for their subsistence had no say in 
their employer's choice. Consequently, it was de-
cided that the insurer must have at least a branch 
office in the Netherlands and a legal representa-
tive, and the insurance agreement had to be laid 
down and implemented in a language the worker 
was proficient in. Any disputes should be brought 
before an administrative court in the Netherlands 
rather than abroad. These restrictions to the free 
movement of services were aimed at protecting 
fundamental workers' interests, which stipulate 
that workers may apply to a designated imple-
menting body in the worker's country of resi-
dence, they have the right to correspond in their 
native language, and can institute proceedings 
against decisions just like national employees. 
Eventually, the government decided to drop the 
possibility of opting out of the system completely 
and restricted the payment of benefits to a five 
year term. 
Taking care of dependents 
Views on survivors' insurance have shifted. More 
emphasis is laid on the private responsibility of 
taking care of dependents. With the introduction 
of the Survivors' Benefit Act (as from 1 July 
1996), the survivor's benefit is only paid to per-
sons born after 1950 and who meet specific re-
quirements; moreover, the benefit is partly re-
lated to income. 
After 2015, the supplementary allowance which 
is paid to Dutch old-age pensioners supporting a 
partner under 65 will be cancelled. Individualisa-
tion of social security is taking shape more and 
more clearly. Elderly people themselves will be-
come increasingly responsible for arranging ad-
ditional coverage. 
AUSTRIA 
Privatisation in Austrian Employment Market 
Administration 
On 1 July 1994 a comprehensive organisation re-
form went into effect in Austrian employment 
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market administration. The state-run administra-
tive branch for the labour market had been disen-
gaged from the federal administrative system and 
transferred to an independent service enterprise 
operating under public law, the employment mar-
ket service. 
The tasks of the employment market service con-
sist primarily of attending to the unemployed and 
companies, paying out benefits during unemploy-
ment, and regulating access to the labour market 
by non-national workers. 
The employment market service is arranged into 
one federal, nine state and approximately 100 
regional organisations, with each being run by a 
committee constituted on a basis of parity. These 
committees are comprised of representatives from 
the employment market service and from em-
ployers and employees. 
By not assuming any tasks unrelated to the labour 
market, which had been carried out previously by 
the labour market's administrative branch, the 
employment market service is supposed to be 
able to concentrate on the central tasks of work 
placement and consultation. 
Private Work Placement 
Work placement has long been carried out in the 
field of music, art and entertainment by private 
agencies which receive commissions both from 
the artists and employers for successfully finding 
employment for the artists. 
Since 1992 work placement has been in effect for 
employers paying a fee to find executive employ-
ees and, in the wake of the organisation reform of 
employment market administration enacted on 1 
July 1994, private work placement became per-
missible for all professions. In addition, there is 
now also a placement service run by charitable 
organisations free of charge. There are now 14 
placement agencies for executive employees and 
16 remaining private agencies, as well as 38 artist 
placement agencies and 5 charitable placement 
services. 
The activities of the private placement services 
were only slight in volume in 1996. One-third of 
the certified placement agencies did not execute 
or had not yet executed their services. There were 
a total of only 945 job placements. There were 
about 11,000 job-seekers on average in 1996, and 
the average number of openings was 386. 
A steep gain in private work placement is also not 
to be expected for 1997. 
Continued payment of remuneration in case of 
sickness for white-collar workers 
By vertue of the White-Collar Workers' Act of 
1921, employers are obliged to continue payment 
of the full amount of wages during a fixed period 
- depending on the duration of the working rela-
tion - in case of sickness of a white-collar worker. 
At present, the entitlement to continued full pay-
ment of wages is for a minimum of 6 weeks and 
for 12 weeks maximum and for a further 4 weeks 
at half of their wages. During 100% continued 
payment of wages, sickness benefit is not paid; 
during continued payment of half of their wages, 
workers are entitled to a sickness benefit amount-
ing to 50% of the total amount. 
FINLAND 
In Finland the private sector has always played an 
important role in organising social security. The 
Employment Pension Scheme is fully adminis-
tered by private pension institutions (pension in-
surance companies, pension funds and pension 
foundations). Also the Statutory Accident Insur-
ance is handled by private non-life insurance 
companies. 
In Health Care the role of the private sector is 
more limited but still not insignificant. Health 
care in Finland is arranged as a National Health 
Scheme, where the municipalities are responsible 
for both providing and financing health care. 
Traditionally municipalities arranged the health 
care services themselves, but today they are free 
to buy services from each other or from the pri-
vate sector. (Due to the developed provision level 
of the municipalities themselves, and also to the 
fact that private services are mostly available 
ohly in cities, this part is still rather limited). 
The private sector covers some 20 % of all visits 
to doctors. · 
. In the health care of employees, Occupational 
Health Care plays an important part. Here the 
employer organises health care that provides the 
same services as the primary health care centres. 
Sometimes also specialist treatment and other 
services are offered. The services covering pri-
mary health care are reimbursed to the employer 
to 50 % from the Sickness Insurance. 
The private sector also plays an important role in 
the childrens' day care. The municipalities are 
responsible for arranging day care for all children 
under 7 years. In addition to providing the serv-
ice in municipal day care centres, the municipali-
ties also acquire day care by buying the service 
from the private sector. Some municipalities also 
pay parents, who arrange the day care them-
selves, an additional bonus on top of the home 
care allowance available to all who do not use the 
municipal day care service (the parents can either 
take care of the child themselves or pay for the 
care on the private market). The percentage of 
private day care services is expected to rise. To-
day the share is ea 6 %. 
As from 1 August 1997 the child home care al-
lowance scheme will be reformed. According to 
the new system parents may choose between a 
child home care allowance and a private child 
care allowance. 
In services provided to old people the private sec-
tor share is ea 10 %. 
In the service sector the role of the private sector 
is generally expected to rise. Instead of providing 
all services themselves, the municipalities are 
using private providers. This offers an added 
flexibility to the schemes. The municipalities still 
remain responsible for the services and also for 
the financing. 
There have been no other major changes in the 
structure in the last years. There are no plans to 
privatise any other parts of social security either. 
The advantages of the Finnish scheme are the 
following: 
- The element of market competition between 
the institutions makes them more service-cen-
tred. 
- The statutory scheme institutions are super-
vised by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health. Thus there is good control of the 
scheme . 
- The social partners play an active role in de-
veloping and supervising the schemes 
The draw-backs are: 
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- The scheme structure does not fit well in to 
straightforward rules concerning the public 
and private sector agents. 
- There are problems of interpretation of EU 
rules (also Council of Europe standards). 
•••• •**• •**• 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
"Privatisation" is not, strictly speaking, a word 
that can be applied to the United Kingdom's so-
cial security system, although external "private" 
suppliers are increasingly involved in supporting 
the delivery of services, including management of 
the Department of Social Security's (DSS) estate. 
In recent years, it has been Government policy to 
encourage greater personal responsibility for 
making financial provision for such life events as 
retirement from work, to supplement the individ-
ual's entitlement to basic State benefits. 
One partial exception to this, however, is demon-
strated by the history of Statutory Sick Pay (SSP), 
where responsibility for providing a level of earn-
ings-replacement for employees unable to work 
because of short-term sickness has been trans-
ferred from the State, not to the individual con-
cerned, but to the employer. 
When SSP was first introduced in 1983 employ-
ers were able to recover 100% of SSP paid out 
(plus a further 7% to compensate for National In-
surance Contributions {NICs) due from the em-
ployers on the SSP they were paying); in 1991 
the 7% NICs compensation was abolished and the 
SSP compensation was reduced to 80%. Finally, 
in 1994 the automatic 80% reimbursement was 
BELGIUM 
Reform of statutory pensions for employees 
and the self-employed 
Several royal orders have recently gone into force 
within the framework law of 26 July 1996, bring-
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also abolished. There is, however, still help avail-
able for employers with a large percentage of the 
workforce off sick at any one time who are reim-
bursed SSP costs exceeding 13% of their monthly 
National Insurance (NI) bill. 
Employees who do not qualify for· SSP may be 
entitled to Incapacity Benefit (IB) if they satisfy 
the NI qualifying conditions. 
Although the Government are, committed to re-
taining the basic state Retirement Pension (RP) as 
the foundation of pension provision, they also in-
tend to support and strengthen the framework for 
occupational pensions in the UK. At the end of 
1995 the amount invested in UK occupational 
and personal private pension funds was approxi-
mately £650 billion and 14 million employees 
had contracted out of the State Earnings Related 
Pension Scheme (SERPS), whilst retaining their 
right to basic RP. 
DSS currently spends £ 1.5 billion outside the De-
partment buying in goods and services and is ex-
amining the scope for making greater use of ex-
ternal suppliers where they can contribute invest-
ment and new ideas to help achieve efficiency in 
DSS business. Plans include: 
• involving external suppliers in the manage-
ment of the DSS estate. The aim is for DSS to 
become occupiers of serviced accommodation 
which meets DSS needs at lower cost, rather 
than the owners and managers of the property 
itself; 
• outsourcing the delivery of Child Benefit; 
• the involvement, for 12 months, of private 
companies in the delivery of benefits in three 
of the Benefits Agency's 13 areas; and 
• the transfer of the Benefits Agency's Medical 
Services to the private sector by mid-1997. 
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ing about the modernisation of Social Security 
and assuring the viability of the statutory pension 
schemes. 
These orders concern the reform of pension 
schemes for employees and the self-employed. 
(The new reform measures affecting the statutory 
pension scheme of public sector employees are 
still being negotiated.) 
Enforcement Date 
The reform applies to pensions taking effect as of 
1 July 1997. 
Contents of pension reform for employees 
Achieving equal treatment for men and women: 
On Retirement Pensions: 
- by raising the retirement age of women pro-
gressively so as to fall in line with that of men, 
namely 65 years (adjustment completed by 
2009) 
- by a reform of the pension calculation method: 
progressive calculation of woman's career by 
taking into consideration 1/45 - as it is for 
men- instead of 1/40. 
Effect of equalising the retirement age in the 
other Social Security sectors: 
Thus, the age limit for women receiving unem-
ployment and disability benefits is raised progres-
sively to the uniform age of 65 in the same incre-
ments as are used for the retirement age described 
above. 
On guaranteed income for the elderly: 
The age granting the elderly guaranteed income is 
levelled off to 65 years for men and women. 
The age requirement for female beneficiaries is 
raised progressively from 61 years (as of 1 July 
1997) to 65 years ( on 1 January 2009), in accor-
dance with a transitional scheme determined by 
analogy with the pension scheme. 
Current age regulations for 60-year-old women to 
obtain guaranteed income are maintained in fa-
vour of those women whose guaranteed income 
has taken effect before 1 July 1997. 
The possibility of drawing an "early" pension as 
of 60 has been maintained, provided that every 
male or female worker works henceforth for a 
minimum duration of his or her profession, equal 
to 20 years in 1997 and changing gradually to 35 
years in 2005. 
A part-time pension in favour of beneficiaries at 
least 60 years of age has been established. 
Compensatory measures aimed at suppressing dis-
crimination of women in the field of employment 
and pay have been established, measures such as: 
- Guarantee a right to a minimum pension for 
each career year: For each year of one third 
employment the right to a minimum pension 
rate, calculated on the basis of the current 
minimum average monthly income at 21 years 
of age and adjusted according to this income 
amount is guaranteed under certain conditions. 
- Periods of career interruption for rearing a 
child under 6 years old are taken into consid-
eration (to a maximum of 36 months total) 
when calculating the career requirement for 
being able to draw early retirement pension. 
Reform of the social status of the self-employed 
As regards pensions the retirement age for women 
is gradually increased to 65 years (fully adjusted 
to the age of men by 2009). 
A supplementary contribution increase of 7% to 
be applied the year following one in which no 
contributions were paid has been established. 
The regulations on carrying out an additional, in-
dependent activity have been modified: the 
threshold at which the self-employed, working on 
a supplementary basis, do not owe contributions 
has been cut in half. 
In the performance of a company's mandate, 
there is irrefutable presumption that the relevant 
professional activity is being carried out by a 
self-employed person. 
Social contributions were increased. 
A new social insurance for bankruptcy involving 
the self-employed as head workers (because 
bankruptcies are doubled in Belgium within 1 b 
years) has been established. This insurance aims 
to extend rights to health care and family benefits 
during the four trimesters following the bank-
ruptcy and to grant a replacement income during 
the two months after bankruptcy (to compensate, 
to a certain extent, the absence of any right to un-
employment allowances). 
A global financial management (globalisation of 
resources) has been established. 
Family allowances 
Extension of the right to family allowances for 5 
years in favour of families with children who 
have disappeared. 
Replacement of "maribel bis et ter" assistance 
system 
As a reminder, this assistance consists of a set re-
duction in contributions, accompanied by a vari-
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able reduction depending on the strength of the 
company's labour force. 
Belgium has been given formal notice by the 
European Commission to reform this regulation, 
since it was only directed at sectors subject to 
strong international competition. 
As of 1 July 1997, it will affect all sectors em-
ploying workers and consist of: 
a set reduction of BEF 7 ,OOO per year and per 
worker 
a variable reduction of BEF 42,500 to be mul-
tiplied by the percentage of workers in the 
company (limited to 66%) 
for small companies of less than 6 workers, 
the reduction is a minimum ofBEF 32,000 per 
worker 
Changes to the scheme of the local agencies for 
the integration into employment ("ALE") 
As a reminder, this scheme tends to offer the un-
employed the possibility of doing activities un-
available in the normal work channels. The long-
term unemployed that have been receiving full 
compensation benefits are automatically regis-
tered and will be expected to do the suitable 
work, under penalty of administrative sanctions. 
Modifications to the scheme primarily target the 
notion of "authorised activity" and the principle 
of voluntary enrolment, where there is a shortage 
of unemployed persons automatically registered. 
Establishment of a social identity card for wel-
fare recipients 
This card should: 
- facilitate the identification of the insured per-
son by Social Security institutions, 
establish an easy electronic exchange of in-
formation concerning the insured person and 
assure administrative simplification in fulfill-
ing the obligation of the employer and some 
institutions to declare the work carried out by 
the employees. 
Thus, as part of their direct relations with the 
welfare recipients, the Social Security institutions 
will be obliged as of 1 July 1998 at the latest to 
make use of the social identity cards matching the 
individual insured person. This obligation is 
valuable in satisfying the institutions' obligations 
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in the field of social security, labour law and 
taxation. 
PORTUGAL 
Following a normal absence of legislative meas-
ures taken in the area of Social Security mainly 
on account of the change of government in Octo-
ber 1995, certain initiatives have been taken. 
These initiatives can be approached at three dif-
ferent levels: 
The creation of a Commission in charge of 
preparing a White Paper on the social security 
reform; 
The celebration of an Agreement on Strategic 
Dialogue between the government and social 
partners, concerning economic, financial and 
social measures for the presiding legislature; 
- Concrete legislative measures. 
With respect to the Commission responsible for 
the White Paper, the initial period set for presen-
tation of the study was extended by 3 , months 
until the end of 1997. 
In its first work phase, the Commission presented 
in August 1997 a Green Paper on social security 
for the purpose of a public debate. 
Participation in this debate was intense and the 
Commission's final proposal on the social secu-
rity reform has already been presented. 
With respect to the Agreement on Strategic Dia-
logue, the basic outlines relating to social insur-
ance are the following: 
Reduction of the non-wage expenses for en-
terprises and, in certain cases, the contribution 
costs for workers; 
Expansion of unemployment protection by: 
* increasing the entitlement period for unem-
ployment social allowance when the worker 
is at least 45; 
* establishing a partial unemployment allow-
ance for workers who already receive an 
allowance and begin working part time; 
* introducing a contribution ceiling into the 
general scheme; 
* implementing studies on the flexibility of 
the retirement age for pensions; 
* developing supplementary occupational 
schemes; 
* combating evasion of contribution pay-
ments and fraud. · 
These points have already been the subject of 
studies and even of legislative projects. 
Among the newly enacted legislative measures, 
the most important worth mentioning are the fol-
lowing: 
Organisation 
Taking into account the importance that an effec-
tive co-ordination between employment and so-
cial security represents, the Government has de-
cided, without dispelling the fundamental princi-
ple of social solidarity, to proceed with merging 
the Ministry of Qualification and Employment 
with the Ministry of Solidarity and Social Secu-
rity. 
Therefore, now a Ministry of Labour and Solidar-
ity exists with three State Secretariats: State Sec-
retariat for Employment and Training, State Sec-
retariat for Social Security and Labour Relations 
and State Secretariat for Social Integration. 
Scheme for Self-Employed 
The scheme for the self-employed was modified 
in December 1996. 
The changes essentially affected: 
::::) the persons covered; 
::::) the calculation basis of contributions; 
::::) sickness insurance. 
At the level of the persons covered by this 
scheme, two changes were made: 
First, those persons whose annual amount of in-
come earned from their independent activity is 
equal to or less than six times the minimum sal-
ary are no longer compulsory insured. However, 
if income drops below this benchmark once in-
sured, the person will continue to be compulsory 
insured, but calculation of contributions will be 
reduced to half of the minimum salary, with a 
minimum limit.being 50% of this salary. 
Second, a person who begins to be self-employed 
is only obligated to enrol after the twelfth month. 
Yet the self-employed whose incomes are less 
than half of the minimum salary are free to enrol; 
those whose incomes are between half of the 
minimum salary and this salary amount are free 
to choose a contribution calculation basis equal to 
or higher than the minimum salary. 
Prior to changes in the scheme, the mm1mum 
amount used for the calculation basis of contri-
butions was that of the minimum salary. Pres-
ently, those persons who had incomes below six 
times the minimum salary during the preceding 
year benefit, if they place the request, from a cal-
culation basis for contributions corresponding to 
the average value of real incomes, with the bot-
tom limit being half of the minimum salary. 
Sickness insurance for the self-employed was 
also reduced: 
The waiting period for allowance, which was 3 
days, will change to 30, except in cases of hospi-
talisation where no waiting period is required. 
The duration of allowance will shift to 365 days, 
while it had formerly been 1095 days. 
Inclusion in contribution periods has also become 
more strict in that wages are only registered from 
now on for days on which the sickness benefit is 
paid out, whereas this inclusion process had been 
previously applied to all days of incapacity. 
Unemployment 
The duration for receiving unemployment social 
allowance for workers between the ages of 45 and 
5 5 has been extended by six months. 
Family Benefits 
An extensive change in the family benefit scheme 
went into effect in July 1997. 
The innovative aspects are essentially the follow-
ing: 
The family allowance, allowance for nursing 
mothers and birth allowance have all been com-
bined into a single benefit called "Family allow-
ance for children and youth". 
The amount of this benefit is determined on the 
basis of each family's income, the number of 
eligible dependants and their respective ages. 
For this purpose, the incomes of the worker's 
family are determined on the basis of three tiers 
adjusted through indexation to the minimum sal-
ary: 
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up to 1.5 times the minimum salary; 
from 1.5 to 8 times the minimum salary; 
over 8 times the minimum salary. 
Thus, the higher the income, the lower the benefit 
amount. 
This benefit is increased according to family in-
come and, during the first 12 months of an in-
fant's life, it is subject to a bonus where the child 
is handicapped. 
The marriage grant has been done away with and 
the funeral grant only exists for the decease of 
relatives close to the worker, because another al-
lowance already exists for the death of the latter. 
Access to benefits, too, has become more rigid 
with respect to the contribution period of the 
worker. This restriction is intended to reduce 
fraud, with it having been previously sufficient to 
pay one day of contributions in the course of one 
year to be entitled to benefits for a 12-month pe-
riod. But from now on it is necessary to have 6 
months of registered payments within the course 
of the 12 months which precede acknowledge-
ment of entitlement to the aforesaid benefits. 
Maternity Protection 
The framework law for maternity was modified 
with respect to the rights of parents of handi-
capped children or of those who suffer from 
chronic illnesses and who are not over 12 years 
old. 
In effect, the working mother or father is entitled 
to a six-month leave which can be extended up to 
four years. During this period, if the children are 
seriously handicapped, the parents may request 
an allowance whose amount may not exceed 
twice the highest minimum salary. 
Employment Injuries and Occupational Dis-
eases 
The Parliament has approved a law in this area, 
whose regulation is currently in progress. 
The benefit outline is identical to that of the ear-
lier scheme, but the rules governing calculation 
of and access to benefits are more favourable. 
Verification System of Incapacity 
The verification scheme of incapacity in the so-
cial security system has been restructured. 
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Verification of worker's invalidity, which had 
been previously effected by the health care sys-
tem, has been successfully transferred to regional 
social security agencies since 1987. For this pur-
pose, the "Verification System of Long-Term In-
capacity" was created. 
Temporary incapacity, in tum, is declared by the 
health care system. 
Nevertheless, in certain cases a prolongation of 
the temporary incapacity status may be subject to 
confirmation by a "Verification System of the 
Temporary Incapacity", which has also been in-
stituted within the regional agencies. This restruc-
turing process aimed not only to unify the two 
systems of verification in such a way as to in-
crease their functioning efficiency and to combat 
fraud but also to enlarge the intervening aspect of 
this new system, the "Verification System of In-
capacity" (VSI), especially with respect to verifi-
cation of handicaps. 
Invalidity 
Taking into account the grave situation that fol-
lows from the invalidity of persons affected by 
AIDS and who, as a rule, have a short contribu-. 
tion career, the Government is in the process of 
approving a legislative project which would re-
duce the compulsory contribution period gener-
ally required and allow a more favourable calcu-
lation of their pensions. 
Guarantee of Resources 
Even though the law on Minimum Income was 
expected to go into effect on 1 July 1997, these 
principles had already been applied earlier in an 
experimental effort, thus having allowed a more 
efficient and rapid application of the law. 
The minimum income benefit is awarded to per-
sons who are available for work, and its amount 
corresponds to the difference between the mini-
mum income, whose amount is determined by 
law, and family income, which depends on the 
applicant. 
Protection coverage, however, is not restricted to 
a cash benefit awarded by the social security sys-
tem, but rather it also integrates measures con-
cerning professional integration, training, health 
care, education and even housing. 
Adjustment of Benefits 
All benefits have been subject to an adjustment, 
generally higher than the inflation rate. 
A special adjustment of pensions was effected for 
the oldest persons having longer contribution ca-
reers. 
SWEDEN 
Base amount 
The base amount has been raised to SEK 36,300. 
Medical care 
There have been changes in the co-payment li-
ability for medical care and drugs. Previously, the 
liability was limited to a maximum of SEK 
2,200/year. 
The list of diseases and associated treatments that 
attracted 100% reimbursement has been abol-
ished. Full reimbursement, funded by the coun-
ties, is now limited only to insulins. 
All non-diabetic patients now have to pay the full 
cost of all prescribed medication until they reach 
an accumulated total spending of SEK 400 in a 
12-month period. For costs between SEK 401 and 
SEK 1,200, SEK 1,201 and SEK 2,800, and SEK 
2,801 and SEK 3,800, the reimbursed portion is 
50%, 75% and 90% respectively, and the maxi-
mum outlays are SEK 800, SEK 1,200 and SEK 
1,300. When the costs in a year exceed SEK 
3,800 and the accumulated out-of-pocket spend-
ing is SEK 1,300 any additional medicine pre-
scribed is free-of-charge to the patient, with the 
costs absorbed by the counties. Costs for children 
under 18 years of age within a family unit may be 
added together. 
Liability for other health services costs is limited 
to SEK 900. 
Sickness insurance 
Sick pay period 
The 14-day sick pay period, during which the em-
ployer provides sick pay to the employee in case 
of sickness, has been extended to 28 days. 
Parental insurance 
The possibility of drawing parent's cash benefit at 
3/4 of a full benefit has been introduced and the 
raised benefit level during 60 days in connection 
with child birth has been abolished. 
Survivor's pensions 
The general period during which adjustment pen-
sion is given has been · shortened from twelve 
months to six months. 
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